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Abstract
Why are nearly simultaneous stimuli frequently perceived in reversed order? The origin of errors in temporal judgments is a
question older than experimental psychology itself. One of the earliest suspects is attention. According to the concept of
prior entry, attention accelerates attended stimuli; thus they have ‘‘prior entry’’ to perceptive processing stages, including
consciousness. Although latency advantages for attended stimuli have been revealed in psychophysical studies many times,
these measures (e.g. temporal order judgments, simultaneity judgments) cannot test the prior-entry hypothesis completely.
Since they assess latency differences between an attended and an unattended stimulus, they cannot distinguish between
faster processing of attended stimuli and slower processing of unattended stimuli. Therefore, we present a novel paradigm
providing separate estimates for processing advantages respectively disadvantages of attended and unattended stimuli. We
found that deceleration of unattended stimuli contributes more strongly to the prior-entry illusion than acceleration of
attended stimuli. Thus, in the temporal domain, attention fulfills its selective function primarily by deceleration of
unattended stimuli. That means it is actually posterior entry, not prior entry which accounts for the largest part of the effect.
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Introduction
Processing of temporal information is crucial to human life. It is
involved in a wide range of experiences and behaviors (cf. [1]), for
instance in biological rhythms, speech, and control of motor
behavior. Veridical processing of temporal information seems vital
and adaptive because deficits in temporal information-processing
accompany many neurological, psychological, and developmental
disorders occasionally causing severe difficulties in interactions
with the environment (e.g., neglect: [2]; visual extinction: [3];
aphasia: [4]; attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: [5]; schizo-
phrenia: [6] and dyslexia: [7]). Nevertheless, errors in temporal
judgments are surprisingly common and not restricted to patients
with neurological, psychological or developmental disorders but
occur frequently in temporal judgments of the normal population.
For instance, two physically simultaneous stimuli are often
perceived as successive [8–11] and the order of two rapidly
succeeding stimuli is frequently reversed (e.g., [9,12–16]). The
source of these and other temporal errors aroused interest even
before the beginning of experimental psychology itself [9,17–19]
and was for the first time systematically investigated in the field of
astronomy.
1.1 Temporal Errors in Astronomy
In 1796 Nevil Maskelyne, Astronomer Royal at Greenwich
observatory, dismissed his assistant David Kinnebrook because he
deviated from Maskelyne himself by 800 ms in estimating the
moment in time when a star crossed a wire on the Greenwich
telescope, a stellar transit. Since the method of observation, the
‘‘eye and ear method’’, was assumed to be eight times as accurate,
this deviation was severe. However, its theoretical importance
remained unnoticed until the 1820s when Bessel systematically
investigated judgments of stellar transits made by several well-
trained astronomers and found even larger deviations. Bessel and
other astronomers formalized such interindividual deviations in so
called personal equations (e.g., [17,19]).
But what is the origin of these large deviations between
astronomic observers? In the eye and ear method, an observer
begins to count the second beats on a clock when a star
approaches one of the vertical wires of a telescope. He remembers
the spatial positions of the star at the beat just before and just after
the star crosses the wire. Then, the remembered spatial distances
from these positions to the wire are translated into a temporal
estimate of the moment in time at which the star crossed the wire
(for a more detailed description of the eye and ear method see [19]
or [18]). Although there are doubtlessly several sources causing
personal equations – such as differences in neural transmission
times for audition and vision (e.g., [8,20], impaired recollection of
the stars’ spatial positions or rounding errors in estimating a star’s
transit [18] –, the most frequently blamed source is attention, e.g.,
[8,9,19,21,22]. Assuming that allocating attention to a stimulus is a
precondition for its conscious perception and takes time (e.g.,
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[23]), personal equations can be accounted for by differences in
the allocation of attention towards the visual and auditory
modality. Supposing Maskelyne primarily paid attention to vision
– the position of the star –, whereas Kinnebrook primarily paid
attention to audition – the clock’s beats –, they had to perceive a
stellar transit at different points in time. This gives the stimulus in
the primarily attended modality (star or clock beat) a headstart into
following stages of information processing.
1.2 Attention as Source of Errors in Temporal Judgments
Thus attention is an old suspect regarding errors in temporal
judgments. The facilitating influence of attention on temporal
information processing has become known as the notion of prior entry
(e.g., [13–15,19,24–27]). According to this explanation, attention
leads to acceleration of attended stimuli and consequently to their
‘‘prior entry’’ to perceptive processing stages, including conscious-
ness. This acceleration of attended stimuli would be accompanied
by reversals of temporal order and errors in judgments of
simultaneity. Prior-entry effects have been revealed many times
within and between modalities (e.g. vision: [13,24,26–28];
audition: [29]; tactile modality: [10,30]; bimodal: [22]; for an
overview see [31]). Yet, the most frequent methods for assessing
prior-entry effects – temporal order judgments (TOJ) and
simultaneity judgments (SJ) – do not allow a complete test of the
prior-entry hypothesis.
In both tasks, two target stimuli – for instance a click and a flash
– are presented in fast succession or simultaneously. Two factors
are varied between experimental trials, the temporal interval
between the stimuli (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA) and
whether attention is directed to one of the stimuli or not. The
observers’ task is either to judge which of the two stimuli appeared
first (TOJ) or whether both stimuli appeared simultaneously (SJ).
The prior-entry effect is operationalized as shift in the point of
subjective simultaneity (PSS). The PSS usually corresponds to
objective simultaneity if attention is not manipulated and is shifted
to a temporal interval at which the unattended stimulus objectively
leads the attended one if attention is directed. The PSS is either
represented by the temporal interval at which both stimuli are
most frequently judged as simultaneous (SJ, e.g., [10]) or the
temporal interval at which both order judgments are given equally
often (TOJ, e.g., [13]). In these tasks, prior-entry effects thus
represent relative processing advantages for attended in comparison
to unattended stimuli. However, as stated above, the prior-entry
hypothesis goes beyond the prediction of a relative processing
advantage. As its name indicates, it implies that processing of
attended stimuli is accelerated. Although relative processing
advantages for attended stimuli are traditionally interpreted as
acceleration of attended stimuli (prior-entry hypothesis), they
could just as easily be explained by deceleration of unattended
stimuli (posterior-entry hypothesis). Deceleration of unattended
stimuli seems to be even more plausible because veridical
perception of attended – thus possibly (action-) relevant informa-
tion – should be most beneficial: Imagine a botanist trying to catch
a rare butterfly in a cloud of common butterflies. It would be most
helpful to perceive the rare butterfly veridically in time, whereas
processing of the common butterflies would be slowed down. This
possible interpretation seems to have escaped most researchers.
Only two studies found indirect support for a posterior-entry
hypothesis: Spence, Nicholls and Driver [32] found that directing
attention to a specific modality primarily led to deceleration of
discrimination latencies in unattended modalities. In their visual
prior entry study Shore et al. [28] found evidence for prior entry
as well as posterior entry in rare simple RT trials which were
intermixed with temporal order judgment trials. RTs were faster
for valid cues than for invalid cues in comparison to a neutral
baseline.
The aim of the present study is a genuine test of the prior- vs.
posterior-entry hypothesis. Therefore we developed a new
paradigm providing separate estimates of processing (dis)advantages
for attended and unattended stimuli in comparison to a baseline
condition without the manipulation of attention. It relies on one of
the oldest prior-entry paradigms – the complication clock of
Wilhelm Wundt [9]. In a complication experiment, observers
watch the movement of a clock’s hand while waiting for a single
event in another sense modality, for example a sound. The
observer judges the hand’s position at the moment the sound
appears. Usually, hand positions that lie objectively before the
appearance of the sound are reported (e.g., [9,25]; for more recent
studies using versions of complication paradigms see [33–36]).
Prior entry provides a probable explanation for this finding as
paying attention to the sound would lead to its earlier perception.
Recently, Carlson, Hogedoorn and Verstraten [37] adapted the
complication clock paradigm to assess the speed of visual attention
shifts. Observers watched an array of clocks with rotating hands
and reported the time of one of these clocks indicated by a
peripheral or central cue at the moment when this cue appeared.
Clock times revealed latencies of 140 ms for an attention shift
initiated by a peripheral cue and 240 ms for an attention shift
initiated by a central cue. More recently, Hogendoorn, Carlson
and Verstraten [38] used the same paradigm to assess the latency
of attentional selection. Additionally, Carlson and colleagues used
adaptations of this task to assess attention shifts and attentional
dwell time in attentive tracking [39] or the costs of dividing
attention [40]. Furthermore Keetls and Vroomen [41] used a very
similar technique to assess temporal ventriloquisim. Observers saw
an array of clocks with revolving hands and reported the time of a
specific clock when it was cued. Presenting an irrelevant tone
100 ms before the spatial cue shortened the difference between
actual and reported time. Thus, the tone shifted the temporal
position of the cue (temporal ventriloquism).
To assess posterior and prior entry we combined the TOJ task
with a clock paradigm adapted from Carlson et al. [37]. Observers
watched an array of empty clocks (Figure 1). After variable time,
continuously moving hands appeared in two of these clocks. Two
factors were varied over experimental trials: (1) the temporal
interval between hands’ onsets and (2) whether attention was
directed to one of the clocks by a peripheral cue or not. The
observers’ task was to judge which hand appeared first and to
report the initially displayed time of both clocks. To this end they
adjusted the clocks’ hands to the perceived position of their
appearance. Compared to an ordinary TOJ task, the new
paradigm has the advantage that time judgments provide separate
estimates of advantages or disadvantages of an attended and
unattended stimulus.
Supposing that prior-entry effects are due to acceleration of
attended stimuli, the attended clock’s time will be perceived as
earlier than the same clock’s time if none of the clocks is attended
to. Perceived time of the unattended clock will be unaffected. By
contrast, if prior-entry effects are exclusively due to deceleration of
unattended stimuli, perceived time of the attended clock will be
unaffected, whereas the unattended clock’s time will be perceived
as later than the same clock’s time if attention is not manipulated.
Finally, if both mechanisms cause prior-entry effects, the attended
clock’s time will be perceived as earlier and the unattended clock’s
time as later than if attention is not manipulated.
According to Carlson and coworkers [37–40] as well as
Vroomen and Keetels [41] the clock task provides a rather direct
measure of perceptual latency or latencies of an attention shift; the
Posterior Entry
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clock times should thus be closely related to perceptual latency
measured by the temporal order judgment in prior-entry research.
(Note that although most researchers seem to agree that some
higher cognitive processing such as attention or consciousness is a
precondition for temporal order judgments, e.g. [16,23,42] some
of these judgments can be made on the basis of onset detection
only [43]). However, even if the strong and debatable presuppo-
sition that the clock task provides a rather direct measure of
perceptual latency or latencies of an attention shift is not shared
and the clock task is interpreted as a spatial task, it will still answer
our question. The clock task may be regarded as a variant of a
spatial task used for studying the Fröhlich effect (e.g. [44–47], for a
recent overview see [48]). In this misperception, the perceived
initial position of a quickly moving stimulus abruptly entering the
visual field is mislocalized in the direction of its motion. Because of
two reasons this basically spatial misperception is likewise
appropriate to answer the question of the present paper. Firstly,
it can reveal a pattern of facilitation and inhibition for the cued
and uncued clock which is what we are interested in. Secondly, the
spatial measures are closely related to temporal values in prior
entry on the basis of the attentional account [23,24] of the
Fröhlich effect: In order to report the spatial position of a (moving)
stimulus, an observer has to complete an attention shift towards
the position of the stimulus. The initial appearance of a moving
stimulus will trigger an attention shift towards its location. Since
the stimulus is moving while attention is under way, the observer
will report a later position of the moving stimulus than its actual
position. In accordance with this attentional account, several
studies [47,49,50] found that the size of the Fröhlich effect was
reduced if the location of the moving stimulus was cued in
advance. In connection with the aim of the present study –
measuring prior entry respectively posterior entry effects with a
clock paradigm – it is important to note that the same attentional
model [23,47] has been used to explain prior-entry effects.
Translated into the spatial terms of the clock task, if prior-entry
effects are due to acceleration or facilitation of the attended
stimulus, the spatial mislocalization of the attended clock should be
reduced by spatial attention – as indeed reported by [47,49,50]. By
contrast, if prior-entry effects are exclusively due to deceleration or
inhibition of the unattended stimulus, the misperception of the
clock from which attention is drawn away should increase in
comparison to the baseline. If, finally, both mechanisms contribute
to the effect, Fröhlich effects on the attended clock will decrease
and those on the unattended clock will increase.
Let us underline again that our argument does not depend on
the assumption that reported clock times actually provide a
measure for perceptual latencies or that the latency of an attention
shift can be computed from these clock times although such claims
have indeed been made by Carlson and colleagues [37–40] as well
as Vroomen and Keetls [41]. Since we compare conditions in
which attention is manipulated (attended clock, unattended clock)
with conditions in which attention is not manipulated, all
differences between these conditions should reflect that part of
the Fröhlich effect which is prone to attention.
Additionally, possible acceleration and deceleration effects
should be modulated by the degree of spatio-temporal interference
caused by direction of attention or by the temporal interval
between the targets. Because the temporal interval between
attention directing cue and cued target in TOJs is fixed, the cue
can direct attention relatively unimpaired if the first target (T1) is
cued but not if the second target (T2) is cued. In the latter case, T1
appearance interferes with attentional allocation by the cue to T2.
Consequently spatio-temporal interference should weaken possible
acceleration of the attended T2 because the cue and T1 compete
for attentional capture. The influence of spatio-temporal interfer-
ence on possible deceleration of the unattended T1 is less clear.
On the one hand, deceleration might be weakened too, whereas
on the other hand, interference might enhance deceleration of the
unattended T1, because deceleration of irrelevant information
would be most convenient under high temporal competition.
Empirical findings of attentional effects that are restricted to high
external noise conditions support this latter assumption. Here,
attentional facilitation of attended locations is primarily achieved
by noise reduction instead of signal enhancement (e.g., [51,52]).
The temporal interval between T1 and T2 appearance can
influence observed effects as well. Spatio-temporal interference
between the targets is larger for small temporal intervals because
two targets in close temporal proximity compete more likely for
attentional capture. For instance, Gibson and Egeth [53] showed
for inhibition of return – inhibition of a cued location after long
Figure 1. Experimental Setup. In two of four empty clocks moving hands appeared with an SOA of either 0 ms, 34 ms, 68 ms, 136 ms or 272 ms.
In two thirds of the trials, either the first or second hand’s clock was cued by flashing the clock’s rim (here indicated by a brighter rim of the clock,
Panel b). In the remaining third of trials (baseline condition) none of the clocks was cued (Panel a).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054257.g001
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cueing intervals above 300 ms – that this attention-related
phenomenon depends on spatio-temporal interference caused by
the cue, as well as the size of temporal interval between the targets.
Inhibition of return was present if T2 was cued but suppressed for
small temporal intervals if T1 was cued. It could only be
demonstrated if T1 was presented more than 100 ms before T2.
Methods
2.1 Participants
Twenty students (twelve female, eight male) of Paderborn
University took part in the experiment. All had normal or
corrected to normal vision verified by a simple test. Participants
received either a financial reward of 6 Euro or participated for
course credit.
2.1.2 Ethical statement. Before conducting the experiment,
participants read and signed an informed consent. All data was de-
identified and analyzed anonymously. Since the Founding Agency
‘‘Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft’’ did not request an ethical
approval and Paderborn University has no board to review ethical
standards, no ethical approval for the experiment was obtained.
This proceeding is in line with the ethical guidelines of the
‘‘Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie’’ which states on ethical
approval :‘‘ C.III.2 Formal ethical approval. If research projects
need a formal ethical approval, psychologists provide precise
information about their research project. They only begin with the
research project after receiving the approval. They conduct their
research project in line with the approved proceeding.’’ Which
kind of research projects need an ethical approval is clarified by
the ethical board of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie: ‘‘In
general a request for ethical approval of a psychological project is
addressed to ethical board if a research funding body (i.e. DFG,
VW-Foundation, FP7 of the EU, federal ministries or federal state
ministries, foundations, universities) requests an ethical approval
for the project. Such a request is usually to be expected if human
participants are put at risks or for studies in which human
participants are not fully aware about the aims and procedures of
the study.’’ These conditions do not apply to the present
experiment. Additionally, the experiment was conducted respect-
ing the ethical standards for research with human participants of
the American Psychological Association.
2.2 Apparatus
Participants sat in a dimly lit room with viewing distance fixated
at 57 cm by a chin rest. The center of the monitor was at eye level.
The experiment was presented on a screen of a 19 inch cathode
ray tube monitor, stimuli were dark gray (26.6 cd/m2) on a light
gray background (93.4 cd/m2). The monitor’s refresh rate was
60 Hz and its resolution was set to 1024 6 768 pixels. The
experimental program was written in Matlab R2009a and made
use of the Psychtoolbox-3 [54,55].
2.3 Stimuli
Four clocks lacking their hands were placed a distance of
approximately 5.7u around fixation. Diameter of the clocks was
2.5u. Target stimuli were two lines (2.1u length) serving as moving
clock hands. They appeared in two of the four clocks in each trial.
A bright flash of one of the clocks’ rims, which was turned off after
34 ms, served as a cue.
2.4 Procedure
At the beginning of each trial, a fixation cross was presented in
the middle of the screen with four symbolic clocks lacking their
hands symmetrically grouped around it. After a random interval,
the first hand (T1) appeared in one of the clocks at a randomly
chosen position, moving continuously in clockwise direction with a
speed of three degrees in 17 ms. After a variable SOA (0 ms,
34 ms, 68 ms, 136 ms or 272 ms), a second hand (T2), moving
with the same speed and direction, appeared. Both hands were
turned off simultaneously after a maximal turn of three quarters of
the clock. In one third of trials, the T1 clock was cued by a bright
flash of its rim (T1 cue). The SOA between cue and target (cueing
SOA) was 166 ms. In a second third of trials, the T2 clock was
cued (T2 cue). In the remaining third, none of the clocks was cued
(no cue). After each trial, observers made a TOJ by choosing the
clock in which the first hand appeared using the arrow keys. They
then adjusted both hands until they displayed their perceived onset
position, using the arrow keys. 240 trials with the factors Cue
36(no cue, T1 cue, T2 cue) 56Target SOA (0 ms, 34 ms, 68 ms,
136 ms, 272 ms) were presented randomly. Each combination of
experimental conditions was repeated 16 times. A session had a
mean duration of 45–50 minutes.
Results
3.1 Temporal Order Judgments
TOJs were analyzed first because an analysis of clock times
would be obsolete without a replication of the standard prior-entry
effect in the present experimental paradigm. For constructing
psychometric functions, target SOAs except SOA zero were
divided into SOAs in which T1 was cued (negative SOAs) and
SOAs in which T2 was cued (positive SOAs). For uncued trials,
positive and negative SOAs were assigned randomly. For each of
the resulting nine target SOAs, order-judgment frequencies were
counted for cued and uncued trials separately. Figure 2 displays
the order-judgment frequencies, which were approximated by
logit analysis [56]. Two parameters were derived from each
psychometric function, the PSS and the difference limen (DL), as
measure of discrimination accuracy. DL values were assessed
because prior-entry effects are sometimes accompanied by changes
in temporal discrimination accuracy. Whereas Stelmach and
Herdman [24] found better discrimination accuracy under
attentional allocation, we found consistently that discrimination
accuracy becomes worse under these circumstances [26,27]. DL is
taken as half of the innerquartile range of the psychometric
function. Smaller DL values thus indicate better discrimination
accuracy.
Three participants’ data were excluded from further statistical
analysis because they showed flat psychometric functions in at least
one experimental condition. PSS differences between uncued and
cued trials revealed a substantial prior-entry effect of 119 ms,
t(16) = 10. 67, p,.001, d = 2.66. A comparison of DL values
revealed no difference between cued (M = 248 ms) and uncued
(M = 244 ms) conditions, t ,1.
3.2 Clock Times
Reported spatial positions of clock hands were translated into
time values. To standardize time judgments, difference-values
between subjective and objective times were calculated for each
combination of clock (T1 clock, T2 clock), cueing condition (no
cue, T1 cue, T2 cue) and target SOA (0 ms, 34 ms, 68 ms,
136 ms, 272 ms). In accordance with the attentional mechanisms
and the experimental rationale discussed in the Introduction, we
took values from no-cue conditions as baseline to remove the
targets’ perceptual latencies if attention is not manipulated, as well
as any other deviation from objective clock times which is not due
to attention, e.g. strategic biases. Therefore, no-cue conditions
difference-values were subtracted from the respective cued-
Posterior Entry
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conditions difference-values. Negative values denote acceleration
effects, whereas positive values denote deceleration effects in
comparison to the respective uncued baseline-condition (Figure 3).
To test for possible acceleration or deceleration effects we
computed repeated measures ANOVAs, as well as t-tests against
zero; only significant effects will be reported. Since partial eta-
square (gp
2) measured in within-subjects designs is not comparable
with gp
2 assessed in between-subjects designs, we used eta-square
general (gG
2; [57,58]) as measure of effect size to ensure good
comparability between studies. An ANOVA with factors Attention
(cued to target/cued away from target)6Target (T1 clock, T2
clock)6SOA (0 ms, 34 ms, 68 ms, 136 ms, 272 ms) was conduct-
ed. Since targets appear simultaneously at SOA zero, T1 and T2
were defined arbitrarily. Including SOA zero provides the more
conservative test for factor Target because at this SOA T1 and T2
clock times should not differ. A main effect of Attention,
F(1,16) = 66.903, p,.001, gG
2 = .19, was due to a large – both in
numerical and in effect size – deceleration effect (M = 145 ms) for
the uncued clock, t(169) = 9.75, p,.001, d = 0.75 and a smaller
acceleration effect (M = 231 ms) for the cued clock,
t(169) = 21.92, p = .056, d = 0.14. A main effect of Target,
F(1,16) = 10.39, p,.01, gG
2 = .05, demonstrates that time on T1
was postdated in comparison to time on T2 (M = 98 ms vs.
M = 17 ms). Interactions were found for Attention6SOA,
F(3,52) = 9.23, p,.001, gG
2 = .07 and Attention6Target,
F(1,16) = 8.76, p,.01, gG
2 = .004. The interaction SOA6Target
was marginally significant, F(3,53) = 2.45, p = .07, gG
2 = .04. Since
different degrees of spatio-temporal interference probably modu-
late possible acceleration and deceleration effects, we analyzed
time judgments separately for each target SOA (target interfer-
ence) and cue-target combination (cue-target interference).
SOA 0: An ANOVA with the single factor Attention revealed a
main effect of Attention, F(1,16) = 29.52, p,. 001, gG
2 = .63 which
was due to a large deceleration effect (M = 150 ms, t(16) = 3.97,
p,.001, d = 0.99) for the uncued clock and a smaller acceleration
effect (M = 299 ms, t(16) = 22.98, p,.01, d = 0.75) for the cued
clock.
SOA 34: An ANOVA with the factors Attention6Target
revealed a main effect of Attention, F(1,16) = 48.77, p,.001,
gG
2 = .40, which was due to an acceleration effect (M = 289 ms)
for the cued clock, t(33) = 22.87, p,.01, d = 0.50 as well as an
even larger deceleration effect (M = 179 ms) for the uncued clock,
t(33) = 5.1, p,.01, d = 0.89. The interaction Attention6Target was
marginally significant F(1,16) = 4.10, p = .06, gG
2 = .04. T-tests
against zero revealed an acceleration effect for the T1 cue on T1
(M = 2100 ms) and significant deceleration effects for the T1 cue
on T2 (M = 124 ms) and the T2 cue on T1 (M = 232 ms), all ps ,.
05.
SOA 68: An ANOVA with the factors Attention6Target
revealed a main effect of Attention F(1,16) = 31.51, p,.001,
gG
2 = .39, which was primarily due to a large deceleration effect
for the uncued clock (M = 184 ms, t(33) = 4.72, p,.001). A main
effect of Target demonstrates that time on T1 was postdated in
comparison to time on T2 (M = 171 ms vs. M = 247 ms). T-tests
against zero revealed an acceleration effect for the T2 cue on T2
(M = 2160 ms) and a large deceleration effect (M = 305 ms) of the
T2 cue on T1, both ps ,.01.
SOA 136: An ANOVA with the factors Attention6Target
revealed a main effect of Attention, F(1,16) = 11.11, p,.01,
gG
2 = .14, which is due to a deceleration effect for the uncued
clock (M = 116 ms), t(33) = 4.06, p,.001, d = 0.71. The marginally
significant main effect of target, F(1,16) = 3.08, p = .10, gG
2 = .08
demonstrates that time on T1 was postdated in comparison to time
Figure 2. Order judgments. Figure 2 shows the judgment frequencies for the order judgment ‘‘comparison stimulus first’’ for all target SOAs
(2272 ms, 2136 ms, 268 ms; 234 ms; 0 ms; 68 ms; 136 ms; 272 ms) separately for the uncued baseline condition (black circles ) and the cued
condition (white circles). In cued trials, the cued stimulus is defined as comparison stimulus whereas the uncued stimulus defines the standard
stimulus. In uncued trials the labels comparison and standard stimulus are randomly assigned. The horizontal shift of the judgment frequencies
demonstrates a prior-entry effect of 119 ms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054257.g002
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Figure 3. Clock times. Figure 3 shows the results of the time judgments. Effects significantly different from zero were marked with an asterisk, all ps
at least ,.05. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (SEM).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0054257.g003
Posterior Entry
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on T2 (M = 100 ms vs. M = 14 ms). T-test against zero revealed a
deceleration effect of (M = 170 ms) for the T2 cue on T1,
t(16) = 5.55, p,.001, d = 1.39.
SOA 272: An ANOVA with the factors Attention6Target
revealed no significant effects, all Fs ,1.1. T-tests against zero
revealed significant deceleration effects for T1 cue on T1
(M = 130 ms), T2 cue on T1 (M = 108 ms) and T1 cue on T2
(M = 88 ms), all ps ,.05.
Thus the binary TOJ revealed a relative latency advantage of
119 ms for attended stimuli and no influence of attention on
discrimination accuracy. Clock times revealed that the relative
latency advantage for attended stimuli in the TOJ is primarily due
to deceleration of unattended stimuli (145 ms) with a small
contribution of acceleration of attended stimuli (31 ms). Further-
more, deceleration of unattended stimuli was consistently found
for all target SOAs, whereas acceleration of attended stimuli was
found only for the three smallest SOAs (0 ms, 34 ms, 68 ms). At
the longest SOA (272 ms), deceleration effects were even obtained
for attended stimuli. Additionally, deceleration effects were largest
for high spatio-temporal interference between cue and uncued
target (T2 cue on T1) whereas acceleration effects were more often
revealed under conditions in which the cue could capture attention
unimpairedly (T1 cue on T1).
Discussion
Despite its eponymous, traditional interpretation, the temporal
illusion which has been known for over 150 years as the prior-entry
effect is primarily due to deceleration of an unattended stimulus
(145 ms) instead of acceleration of an attended stimulus (31 ms).
Although several researchers suggested that prior-entry effects
could just as well be due to deceleration of unattended stimuli
([15,24]; [22], p. 823; [59], p. 103), the possibility of a posterior-entry
effect has mostly been ignored in the field of prior entry. It is
therefore a crucial question how posterior entry could be
reconciled with prior-entry models. While it provides a serious
challenge for some prior-entry models (e. g. the asynchronous-
updating model, [23]), there are other models which can be easily
adjusted to reflect a posterior-entry mechanism: the temporal-profile
model (TPM, [24]) and the temporal order models adapted by
Schneider and Bavelier [60], the deterministic decision model and
perceptual moment respectively triggered moment model. In the
TPM, temporal order is detected by comparing whole temporal
profiles of stimuli, not only their arrival times. The first peak in the
resulting difference function denotes which stimulus is perceived
first. In the original version of the TPM, attention accelerates
processing of an attended stimulus by sharpening its temporal
profile. But, as already admitted by Stelmach and Herdman, the
TPM could also explain prior-entry effects by decelerated
processing of an unattended stimulus via broadening the
unattended stimulus’ profile. In their original formulation, all
temporal order models described by Schneider and Bavelier could
explain prior entry by an acceleration of transmission time of
attended stimuli. Therefore an attended stimulus would arrive
earlier at the respective decision mechanism and would more likely
be perceived as the first stimulus. Such a mechanism could easily
be adapted to explain posterior-entry under the assumption that
attention decelerates the transmission time of the unattended
stimulus: Therefore the unattended stimulus would arrive later at
the respective decision mechanism and would less likely be
perceived as the first stimulus. In contrast to the described
temporal-order models, the AUM only provides a prior-entry
explanation. Attention is needed to transfer information repre-
sented on feature maps into an internal model which is a necessary
precondition for awareness. Directing attention to a spatial
location before target appearance would accelerate the target’s
transfer into the internal map because otherwise the target would
have had to initiate the time consuming attention shift by itself.
Furthermore, posterior entry is in accordance with the idea that
attention facilitates information processing not only by signal
enhancement but also by exclusion of external noise (e.g., [51]).
Interestingly, we found particularly pronounced deceleration
effects on unattended stimuli for conditions in which spatio-
temporal interference between cue and uncued target is high (T2
cue). This agrees with empirical findings implicating that external
noise reduction underlies attentional facilitation especially under
high external noise [51,52].
It is an interesting question whether posterior entry is also
accountable for cross-modal prior-entry effects (e.g., [22,61]). The
neural mechanisms underlying attention to a location and
attention to a sensory modality might be different [62]. In
consequence the mechanisms underlying intra-and crossmodal
prior-entry effects would be different as well. Therefore it seems
possible that intramodal prior-entry effects, as established in the
present study, are primarily due to posterior entry whereas
crossmodal prior-entry effects are actually due to prior entry. We
have to leave this topic to future research. Summing up, in the
temporal dimension, (spatial) attention fulfills its selective function
primarily by deceleration of unattended, probably irrelevant
information, thereby leading to their posterior entry into higher
stages of information processing.
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